To assume that there always is such a number will miss the problem. For if there is to be a number to measure every magnitude every length, say then numbers themselves must constitute a continuum. But will that be possible? Equivalently, corresponding to every point on a line, is there really a number? The issue is as ancient as Pythagoras.
The natural numbers
Arithmetic begins with naming the sequence of numbers. Otherwise, we cannot count. We name the first number (which in English we call "one"), the second ("two"), the third ("three"), and so on. Ordinality -- first, second, third -- is fundamental.
These are the names of the natural numbers, both their cardinal and ordinal forms. Having named those numbers, we can then make true statements about them, such as "Two plus two is four."
Every thing that has a name, and we can therefore call one, is a unit. One apple, one orange, one axiom. We count units, which is to say, we match them with the sequence of number-names: One apple, two apples, three apples; the first digit, the second, the third. Any collection that we can match with the sequence of number-names, we say is countable.
A natural number is an actual collection of discrete units.

5 people, 10 pencils, 20 million names. The symbols '5,' '10,' '20' -- which are called numerals -- refer to those collections of units, those numbers. That is the nature of language and symbol. The symbol '5' or 'V' is not a number, any more than the word 'cat' will ever say "meeow
"
Children in the elementary grades use "manipulatives" -- matchsticks, blocks, etc. -- which are actual numbers, not their representatives. But that quickly outlives its usefulness, and it becomes conventional to speak of the numerals -- 1, 2, 3, and so on -- as the natural numbers; which they are not.
Mathematical existence
As far as mathematics is concerned, in what sense do these natural numbers exist -- and what do we even mean by the question? Do we mean whether five apples or ten trillion stars exist? Obviously, they do. Or do we mean that the idea of any natural number exists; that there is but one number 5, whose yet-to-be-named form, /////, we recognize in things? The mathematician Leopold Kronecker once observed, "God made the natural numbers. Man has made all the rest."
Apart from the idea of a natural number, or the physical existence of one, such as ten fingers, we have the clearest of models for what we call its mathematical existence. It appears in Euclid's Elements, where a figure, such as a circle or a square, will "exist" only when we have drawn it. For it is a principle of logic that we may not assume that what we have defined exists. (We can define a unicorn, but does a unicorn exist?) And so to simply define a "square" according to our idea of one is not enough. Rather, it is our ability to draw a square -- to produce it -- which shows that it is more than just an idea. As with everything in life that begins as an idea, we must bring it into this world. If we cannot, then it is nothing but an idea, which is to say, a fantasy.
Moreover, statements with the word "all" or "every" -- such as "All right angles are equal" -- refer to all which exist, that is, all which we have actually drawn.
Let us apply this to numbers. We say that a number will exist, mathematically, when we name it. Naming will be a form of producing it. If we have not named it, whether in writing, speech, or thought, then it does not yet exist.
("Do you mean to say that the number 100 does not exist mathematically until I name it?" That is correct, and you have just named it!)
Hence, expressions such as "all" natural numbers, or "every" natural number, will refer to every one that we name; which in practice is all we ever require.
Number as measure
Physical magnitudes -- lengths, say -- are not numbers, yet we try to assimilate them to the laws of numbers. We measure them. Since natural numbers do not have any part (half, tenth, millionth, trillionth), we need a new kind of number. They will be the positive real numbers. They will be the numbers of measurement.
Now what is a measurement? Let PQ represent some physical

magnitude, say a length; and if it is the unit of measure, say 1 cm, and if RS is a magnitude of the same kind, then the name of the real number n will be the measure of RS when, proportionally,
PQ : RS = 1 : n.
That is what a measurement -- a real number -- is: a name for a ratio to the unit of measure, which we name as 1.
5½ feet, 6.78905 grams,
seconds.
Just as a natural number is a collection of discrete units that we are able to name, so a positive real number has a ratio to 1 that we are able to name. The real number is not the ratio itself, which is a relationship with respect to relative size (such as between the base of a triangle and its height). But the real number n names that ratio.
The question, of course, is: Will there always be a name?
("two-thirds").
In English, we name the proper fractions according to that ratio. We call the number we write as 2 over 3 "two-thirds" because of the ratio of 2 to 3: 2 is two thirds of 3. We name the improper fractions analogously. That way of naming the fractions, of course, is completely arbitrary.
In these pages, we have respected the distinction between the name for a ratio and the name for a fraction by writing the name of a fraction hyphenated, but the name of a ratio unhyphenated. Thus the number we call two-thirds is two thirds of 1. (Arithmetic, Lesson 19.)
And for whoever might think there is, then that symbol has no referent, in the sense that the symbol '5' refers to /////. Without a referent, the fractional symbols may obey logical rules but they have no meaning. They have syntax but no semantics. They have nothing to do with measuring.
A specific ratio, then, lies behind the numeral for each rational number. To define a rational number only by how it is written (the quotient of two integers), is like defining a cat as that creature whose name is spelled "c-a-t"
Irrational numbers and their order
A measurement implies a ratio of magnitudes. But magnitudes can be incommensurable. That gives rise to real numbers of the second kind, the irrational numbers. An irrational number does not have the same ratio to 1 that a natural number has to a natural number. An irrational number has no common measure with 1.
Each irrational number -- π,
, ln 2 -- nevertheless names a ratio and hence a measurement. π names the ratio of the circumference of a circle to the diameter.
names the ratio of the diagonal of a square to the side. Every irrational number names at least a ratio to 1.
An irrational number will exist not only on being named, but it must satisfy a property of any "number," namely we must know how to place it with respect to order. Our knowledge of 8 is that it is more than 7 and less than 9. As for an irrational number, we must be able to place it with respect to order relative to any rational number. Is it less than or greater than 2.71828103594612074? That will be our knowledge of an irrational number. In fact, that will be its rational approximation -- which in any case is our only knowledge of an irrational number
For example,
1.414213562373095 <
< 1.414213562373096.
You nor anyone else has ever beheld the actual value of
, or e, or any irrational number.
Nameless numbers?
Arithmetic demands a name for a number. We have a system for naming the natural numbers, and therefore we can name any rational number. Apart from unique irrational numbers such as π and e, names for the irrationals come from the categories of functions: roots, sines, arcsines, logarithms, and so on. But names are discrete. On that point alone, it should be clear that there can be no arithmetical continuum -- a continuum of names is an absurdity.
This should not be surprising. It is not possible to name every point on a line -- equivalently, every distance from 0. Hence it not possible that corresponding to every distance there is a number. Any claim that there is will require "numbers" with no names. Numbers that could never answer a question such as, "How long is it?" "How much time did it take?" "How much does it weigh?"
(And if one claims that answering such questions is irrelevant, then again, those "numbers" have syntax but no meaning.)
In other words, the assertion that the real numbers constitute a continuum will require the oxymoron, "nameless numbers." They will be "numbers" of which we have no knowledge -- which we could never order relative to any fraction. Therefore they are not numbers.
A real number is often defined however as an infinite decimal (that is, as the limit of a sequence of decimals). In that case, there must be a step-by-step procedure, a specific algorithm, to produce the decimal expansion of each one. π is such an example:
π = 3.141592653589793. . .
But if there were an algorithm for "every" real number -- every point on a line -- then the algorithms themselves would constitute a continuum. Again that is absurd, because algorithms are discrete
In fact, the English mathematician and father of artificial intelligence Alan Turing proved the following:
To compute the decimal expansion of a real number, it is possible to create algorithms for only a countable number of them.
In other words, only a countable number of irrationals are computable. Of the rest we have no knowledge -- we can never order them relative to any rational number. Such "numbers" do not exist.
That is the tension then between geometry and arithmetic: It is not possible to name -- to measure -- every length. That is the separation of geometry and arithmetic. There is no arithmetical continuum.
In fact, if AB is the unit length, and C is an arbitrary point on the

line, then, although AC will have a ratio to AB, the probability that there will be a number to name that ratio, that is, to name the length of AC, is virtually 0.
Why the obsession with a continuum of numbers? When mathematicians seized control of Newton's calculus, they transformed it from a theory of measurement into a theory of functions, and they insisted that those functions be functions of continuous variables, and for the values of those variables to be numbers, rather than the physical magnitudes length and time themselves.
A continuum of numbers was thus made into a logical issue, but it is not a practical one. When we do a calculation in calculus, we come up with the name of a number. That is all that anyone has ever done even though the explanation for what we are doing might be nonsense. (At one time, mathematicians explained calculus in terms of "infinitesimals." And neither Newton nor Leibniz could give an intelligible definition of the derivative
)
As for the enunciations of the theorems, they can stay as they are, with the understanding that by "all" real numbers we mean all that we might name or write while doing a problem; that is, all that will actually exist.
The present theory of real numbers, then, together with its associated set theory ("The set of real numbers," "The set of points on a line," etc.), is the most prominent current examples of fantasy mathematics.
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Copyright © 2008 Lawrence Spector
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